

107TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 931

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war
in Sudan.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 7, 2001

Mr. TANCREDO (for himself, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. WOLF, Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma, Mr. PITTS, Mr. CAMP, Mr. Evans, Mr. WELDON of Florida, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. McNULTY, Mr. WHITFIELD, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Ms. RIVERS, Mr. BISHOP, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Ms. NORTON, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. LAMPSON, Mr. UPTON, Mr. HEFLEY, and Mr. CLEMENT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive
solution to the war in Sudan.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Sudan Peace Act”.

5 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

6 Congress makes the following findings:

7 (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified
8 its prosecution of the war against areas outside of

1 its control, which has already cost more than
2 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than
3 4,000,000.

4 (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally
5 sponsored peace process, protected from manipula-
6 tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso-
7 lution of the war, protection of human rights, and
8 a self-sustaining Sudan.

9 (3) Continued strengthening and reform of hu-
10 manitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential
11 element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

12 (4) Continued leadership by the United States
13 is critical.

14 (5) Regardless of the future political status of
15 the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov-
16 ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au-
17 thority and institutions is a major impediment to
18 achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
19 and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace
20 process.

21 (6) Through manipulation of traditional rival-
22 ries among peoples in areas outside their full con-
23 trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used
24 divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their
25 population, and internationally sponsored reconcili-

1 ation efforts have played a critical role in reducing
2 the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.

3 (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and
4 organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and
5 other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties
6 in areas outside of the control of the Government of
7 Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of
8 those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic
9 is in addition to the overt use of bans on air trans-
10 port relief flights in prosecuting the war through se-
11 lective starvation and is used to minimize the Gov-
12 ernment of Sudan's accountability internationally.

13 (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly
14 stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds
15 from future oil sales to increase the tempo and
16 lethality of the war against the areas outside its con-
17 trol.

18 (9) Through its power to veto plans for air
19 transport flights under the United Nations relief op-
20 eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov-
21 ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the
22 receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the
23 United States and other donor countries as a dev-
24 astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the

1 Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out-
2 side of the Government's control.

3 (10) The efforts of the United States and other
4 donors in delivering relief and assistance through
5 means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad-
6 dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov-
7 ernment of Sudan's manipulation of food donations
8 to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

9 (11) While the immediate needs of selected
10 areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad-
11 dressed in the near term, the population in areas of
12 Sudan outside of the control of the Government of
13 Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of
14 their ability to sustain themselves.

15 (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in
16 Bahr al Ghazal, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile
17 regions have been excluded completely from relief
18 distribution by OLS, consequently placing their pop-
19 ulations at increased risk of famine.

20 (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded
21 \$1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on
22 providing only for the immediate food needs of the
23 recipients, the current international relief operations
24 are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long
25 term.

1 (14) The ability of populations to defend them-
2 selves against attack in areas outside the Govern-
3 ment of Sudan's control has been severely com-
4 promised by the disengagement of the front-line
5 sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of
6 the Government of Sudan that success on the battle-
7 field can be achieved.

8 (15) The United States should use all means of
9 pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu-
10 tion to the war in Sudan, including—

11 (A) the multilateralization of economic and
12 diplomatic tools to compel the Government of
13 Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;

14 (B) the support or creation of viable demo-
15 cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of
16 Sudan outside government control;

17 (C) continued active support of people-to-
18 people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in
19 areas outside of government control;

20 (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms
21 to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;
22 and

23 (E) cooperation among the trading part-
24 ners of the United States and within multilat-
25 eral institutions toward those ends.

1 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term “Gov-
4 ernment of Sudan” means the National Islamic
5 Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

6 (2) OLS.—The term “OLS” means the United
7 Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the
8 World Food Program, and participating relief orga-
9 nizations known as “Operation Lifeline Sudan”.

10 **SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN**
11 **RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOV-**
12 **ERNMENT OF SUDAN.**

13 Congress hereby—

14 (1) condemns—

15 (A) violations of human rights on all sides
16 of the conflict in Sudan;

17 (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall
18 human rights record, with regard to both the
19 prosecution of the war and the denial of basic
20 human and political rights to all Sudanese;

21 (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and
22 the role of the Government of Sudan in abet-
23 ting and tolerating the practice;

24 (D) the Government of Sudan’s use and
25 organization of “murahalliin” or
26 “mujahadeen”, Popular Defense Forces (PDF),

and regular Sudanese Army units into organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile regions; and

(E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets that is sponsored by the Government of Sudan; and

(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

**SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED
PEACE PROCESS.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress hereby recognizes that—

(1) a single viable, internationally and regionally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; and

(2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.

1 (b) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The
2 Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel
3 of the Department of State for the support of—

4 (1) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov-
5 ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;

6 (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or
7 implementation; and

8 (3) other United States diplomatic efforts sup-
9 porting a peace process in Sudan.

10 **SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.**

11 It is the sense of Congress that—

12 (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool
13 to facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and

14 (2) the President, acting through the United
15 States Permanent Representative to the United Na-
16 tions, should seek to—

17 (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline
18 Sudan to end the veto power of the Government
19 of Sudan over the plans by Operation Lifeline
20 Sudan for air transport of relief flights and, by
21 doing so, to end the manipulation of the deliv-
22 ery of those relief supplies to the advantage of
23 the Government of Sudan on the battlefield;

1 (B) investigate the practice of slavery in
2 Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimi-
3 nation; and

4 (C) sponsor a condemnation of the Govern-
5 ment of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to
6 aerial bombardment.

7 **SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.**

8 Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
9 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the
10 following:

11 “(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections
12 (d) and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall
13 include—

14 “(1) a description of the sources and current
15 status of Sudan’s financing and construction of oil
16 exploitation infrastructure and pipelines, the effects
17 on the inhabitants of the oil fields regions of such
18 financing and construction, and the Government of
19 Sudan’s ability to finance the war in Sudan;

20 “(2) a description of the extent to which that
21 financing was secured in the United States or with
22 involvement of United States citizens;

23 “(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
24 bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in

1 areas outside its control, including targets, fre-
2 quency, and best estimates of damage; and

3 “(4) a description of the extent to which hu-
4 manitarian relief has been obstructed or manipu-
5 lated by the Government of Sudan or other forces
6 for the purposes of the war in Sudan.”.

7 **SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR**
8 **RELIEF EFFORTS.**

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that the President should continue to increase the
11 use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup-
12 plies in southern Sudan.

13 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
14 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de-
15 tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to-
16 ward carrying out subsection (a).

17 **SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS-**
18 **PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.**

19 (a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a contin-
20 gency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices if
21 necessary, the greatest possible amount of United States
22 Government and privately donated relief to all affected
23 areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains and the
24 Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions, in the event the

1 Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incre-
2 mental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.

3 (b) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—Notwith-
4 standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the
5 plan developed under subsection (a), the President may
6 reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for
7 support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for
8 the purposes of the plan.

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